摘要: |
基于委托代理理论,以2007-2017年中国民营制造业企业为研究对象,本研究着重探究了分析师期望落差与企业研发支出之间的逻辑关系. 研究结果表明:第一,分析师期望落差所引致的绩效压力将驱使管理者削减研发支出,即分析师期望落差对企业研发支出具有显著的负向影响;第二,随着CEO权力的提高,分析师期望落差对企业研发支出的负向影响将增强;第三,随着董事会监督与分析师关注度的提高,CEO权力对分析师期望落差与企业研发支出之间负向关系的增强效应将被削弱. 本研究拓展了文献对资本市场如何影响企业研发决策的理解,同时也丰富了公司治理方面的研究成果. |
关键词: 分析师期望落差 研发支出 CEO权力 董事会监督 分析师关注度 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20181299 |
分类号: |
基金项目:教育部重大攻关项目“中国制造业转型升级战略研究”(15JZD020);国家社会科学基金重点项目“转型升级制度压力下优势制造企业战略反应与政策”(15AGL003);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“中国制造企业转型升级动力机制研究”(17YJA630006). |
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Analyst Expectation Deficit, CEO Power and R&D Expenditure ——The Second Regulation Function Based on Internal and External Governance Mechanisms |
ZHONG Xi,LAN Hai-lin,ZHOU He-hui
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Abstract: |
Based on Principal-agent Theory, this paper takes the Chinese private manufacturing enterprises from 2007 to 2017 as study objects, and investigates the logical relationship between analyst expectation deficit and R&D expenditure. Main findings are as follows. Firstly, the performance pressure incurred by analyst expectation deficit will drive managers to cut R&D expenditure, that is to say, analyst expectation deficit has a significantly negative impact on R&D expenditure. Secondly, as the extent of CEO power increases, the negative impact of analyst expectation deficit on R&D expenditure will be enhanced. Thirdly, with the increase of board monitoring and analyst coverage attention, the enhancement effect of CEO power on the negative relationship between analyst expectation deficit and R&D expenditure will be weakened. This paper expands the understanding on how capital market influences R&D decisions, and enriches the research achievements of corporate governance. |
Key words: analyst expectation deficit R&D expenditure CEO power board monitoring analyst coverage attention |