摘要: |
结合共性技术研发过程,提出了共性技术可持续研发行为的概念框架,借鉴Stackelberg主从博弈思想,本文构建了共性技术供给及后续商业开发承担企业、市场收益实现承担企业和政府三方博弈模型,考虑企业在产业中不同的主导地位,研究政府不同补贴对共性技术可持续研发行为的影响。结果表明:政府应谨慎同时提供两类补贴;当共性技术研发努力成本较高时,政府应优先使用研发努力补贴;当市场收益实现承担企业占主导地位,研发努力成本较低时政府应优先选择使用单位成本补贴;无论是否处于主导地位,企业技术水平对政府补贴相关参数均有较大影响,政府制定补贴政策时须给予充分考虑。研究结论为政府补贴政策制定及共性技术研发实践提供了一定的参考。 |
关键词: 产业共性技术 单位成本补贴 研发努力补贴 可持续研发行为 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20191520 |
分类号:F276.44 |
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“政府支持下产业共性技术研发机制与市场化运行模式研究”(18YJC630266);重庆市自然科学基金(基础研究与前沿探索)面上项目“多重失灵困境下产业共性技术多主体联合研发机制及其运作模式研究”(cstc2019jcyj-msxmX0112);重庆市研究生创新型科研项目“产业共性技术合作研发机制及实现路径研究”(CYS19336)。 |
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Impact of Government Subsidies on Sustainable R&D Behavior of Industrial Generic Technologies |
ZHENG Yue-long1,2, QIN Guo-jing3
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1.Engineering Research Center for Waste Oil Recovery Technology and Equipment of Ministry of Education, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China;2.School of Economic and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China;3.School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
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Abstract: |
Combined with the R&D process of generic technology, it proposed a conceptual framework of generic technology sustainable R&D behavior. Based on the idea of Stackelberg’s master-slave game theory, it built a three-side game model among the enterprise of undertaking supply and subsequent commercial development, the enterprise of achieving market revenue and the government, and studied the impact of different government subsidies on sustainable R&D behavior by considering the different industrial position of enterprise. The results show that the government should avoid providing two kinds of subsidies at one time. When the cost of generic technology R&D effort is high, the government should give priority to using R&D effort subsidies. When the enterprise of achieving market revenue dominants industry, the government should firstly provide the unit cost subsidy if the cost of R&D efforts is low. And then, regardless of the market position of enterprises, the impact of enterprise’s technical level on the relevant subsidy parameters is great, so the government should take into full consideration when making subsidy policies. The results provide references for the subsidy policies and the sustainable R&D practice of generic technology. |
Key words: industrial generic technology unit cost subsidy R&D effort subsidy sustainable R&D behavior |