摘要: |
政府的研发补贴是缓解研发市场失灵和引导经济向高质量发展的重要手段。但是,政府加大研发补贴力度,可能使得企业选择策略性创新导致形成低质量的创新成果。本文首先从“创新崇拜”角度解释陷入这一“囚徒困境”的原因,并提出政府摆脱困境的策略。其次,在博弈分析基础上将政府补贴行为纳入内生增长理论框架,发现政府加大研发补贴力度能够促进实质创新和经济增长,且促进作用存在非线性。最后,利用2006—2016年省际数据进行实证检验,结果表明政府研发补贴与策略性创新产出增长和实质性创新产出增长之间存在着倒U形关系,但只有实质性创新产出的增长才能对经济增长起着显著的促进作用。 |
关键词: 研发补贴 策略创新 实质创新 经济增长 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20191757 |
分类号:F273.1 |
基金项目:浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题“双重要素的结构性配置效率研究与政策启示”(20NDQN275YB);教育部人文社会科学青年项目“中国结构性改革背景下研发投入配置效率与全要素生产率研究”(18YJC790068);浙江省软科学课题“浙江省提高科技成果转化效率的机制与路径研究”(2019C35SA200783)。 |
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Does Government R&D Subsidy Promote Strategic Innovation or Substantive Innovation?Theoretical Models and Empirical Analysis |
HU Shan-cheng1, JIN Lai-qun2
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1.School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;2.School of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, China
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Abstract: |
R&D subsidy is an important measure for the government to make up for the “market failure” in R&D market and to guide high-quality economic development. But increasing government R&D subsidy may drive enterprises to choose strategic innovation which leads to the low-end innovation outputs. It firstly revealed the reasons for getting into the “prisoner’s dilemma” from the perspective of “innovation worship”, and put forwards the strategies for the government to get out of the dilemma. Secondly, on the basis of the game analysis, it added the government subsidy behavior to the frame of endogenous growth theory, and theoretical analysis showed that increasing government R&D subsidy promoted substantive innovation and economic growth, and the relationship are non-linear in the long term. Finally, it made an empirical analysis with the provincial data from 2006 to 2016. The results show that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship among government R&D subsidy and strategic innovation output growth as well as substantive innovation output growth, but only the growth of substantive innovation output promotes economic growth. |
Key words: R&D subsidy strategic innovation substantive innovation economic growth |