摘要: |
通过整合企业行为理论和代理理论,探讨期望落差和期望顺差情况下,企业在风险活动类别选择上存在的差异。基于2013—2018年A股上市公司样本,得出如下研究结论:随着期望落差的扩大,管理者为了避免被解雇,越有可能选择短期导向的违规活动,但无显著的R&D活动倾向;随着期望顺差的扩大,管理者为了提升在劳动力市场上的声望,会倾向于选择长期导向的R&D活动,但无显著的违规活动倾向;此外,企业CEO政治关联、CEO持股会加剧负向期望绩效反馈下企业的违规活动倾向。本文的研究结果充分说明,不同方向的期望绩效反馈水平下,企业在风险承担类别偏好上存在差异。研究结论提高了企业行为理论的解释效力,并为有效遏制企业违规行为、提高企业创新水平提供了启示。 |
关键词: 期望绩效反馈 违规活动 R&D活动 政治关联 CEO持股 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20201264 |
分类号:F273;F019 |
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目“制度抗拒与代际断裂:新生代高管对企业社会责任行为的影响研究”(72072085);国家社会科学基金重点项目“效率视角下军民融合协同创新实现机制研究”(18AGL028);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“期望绩效反馈与企业风险决策关系研究”(NR2021009)。 |
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Expected Performance Feedback and Corporate Risk-Taking ActivitiesAn Integrated Perspective of the Behavior Theory of Firms and the Agency Theory |
ZHANG Dan-ni1, LIU Chun-lin2, LIU Xia-yi3
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1.College of Economic and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106,China;2.School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China;3.College of Business Administration, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362021, China
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Abstract: |
By integrating the behavior theory of firms and the agency theory, it discussed the relationship between different expected performance feedback and risk activity category. Based on the samples of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018, it finds that: when a firm’s performance is below its aspiration level, managers are more likely to choose short-term oriented illegal activities in order to avoid being fired, while there is no significant R&D activities; when a firm’s performance is above its aspiration level, managers tend to choose long-term oriented R&D activities in order to improve their reputation in the labor market, while there is no significant violation activities; the CEO’s political association or CEO’s stock ownership aggravate the company’s tendency of illegal activities under negative expected performance feedback. It indicates that there is a great difference in the selection of risk activity category between negative and positive expected performance feedback. The research conclusions improve the explanatory effectiveness of the behavior theory of the firm, and provide enlightenment for curbing the illegal behavior and improving the level of firms’ innovation. |
Key words: performance feedback violation activity R&D expenditure political tie CEO shareholding |