| 摘要: |
| 以双边平台竞争瓶颈理论框架为基础，考虑同一平台在一边收取注册费、在另一边收取交易费的非对称收费模式，并将已有平台竞争模型拓展至Salop圆形市场情形后，探讨了平台横向合并的经济效应。与已有研究强调间接网络效应、市场势力和成本效率提升三者之间的权衡不同，本文研究发现：在非对称收费模式和市场全覆盖假设下，平台合并的价格效应和福利效应仅与平台间横向重叠导致的市场势力提升与成本效率提升之间的权衡有关，而与间接网络效应无关；如果边际成本较小，则效率抗辩空间会主要集中于降低经营（固定）成本等方面。研究结论不仅可以丰富经济学关于平台合并的理论研究，也可为反垄断执法部门针对平台领域经营者集中审查提供理论借鉴。 |
| 关键词: 双边市场 竞争瓶颈 非对称收费模式 横向合并 平台反垄断 |
| DOI：10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20211850 |
| 分类号:F062.9 |
| 基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“家用主机游戏市场中的网络外部性与平台企业竞争问题研究”（CXJJ-2020-395）。 |
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| Economic Effect of Platform Horizontal Mergers from the Perspective of Asymmetric Fee Charging |
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CHEN Qian
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College of Business， Shanghai University of Finance and Economics， Shanghai 200433， China
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| Abstract: |
| Based on the theory of competitive bottlenecks in two-sided market and considering the asymmetric fee charging that one platform charges fixed fees on one side and transaction fees on the other， it extended the basic model of platform competition to the Salop circular market model and investigated the economic effect of horizontal merger of platforms. Previous literatures show the importance of tradeoff among indirect network effect， market power and cost efficiency in platform merger， while it finds that when assuming that fee charging is asymmetric and market is covered， price effect and welfare effect are related to the tradeoff between market power and cost efficiency， and have nothing to do with indirect network effect. If marginal cost in the two-sided market is small， the room for efficiency defense focuses on aspects such as reducing fixed cost. The results enrich the economic theory about platform merger and provide references to antitrust authorities about investigation on concentration of undertakings. |
| Key words: two-sided market competitive bottleneck asymmetric fee charging horizontal merger platform antitrust |
