The demand in the Internet of Things （IoT） era is characterized by personalization， multi-touch， interaction and dynamism， and it is difficult for the traditional section-level organizations to interact with users at zero distance and make rapid response. Chain group contract is an incentive constraint mechanism pioneered by Haier in the IoT era， which focuses on quick meeting the user experience iteration and reflects the value of people first. The chain group contract overturns the traditional mode of division of labor between enterprises and markets， and poses a major challenge to the traditional enterprise theory. Through theoretical analysis and case dissection of Haier chain group contract， it reveals the efficiency improvement brought by internalization of contract execution， the opportunity cost brought by the incompleteness of contract and its governance principle， and analyzes the importance of dynamic and optimal allocation of residual claims in the chain group. Based on the management practice of Haier’s chain group contract， it reveals the more complex forms of connection between enterprises and markets， and points out the issues of innovation uncertainty and efficiency of chain cluster contracts that need further research.