摘要: |
本文基于2003—2016年中国地级市数据,利用官员任期考察晋升激励对地方政府科技支出的影响。研究发现:在多维绩效考核下,地方官员在任期内会策略性“安排”政府科技支出,官员任期和地方政府科技支出呈U形关系,转折点出现在官员上任的第5~6年。此外,在晋升激励下,地方政府在科技支出方面存在显著的互补型策略互动,且在官员第一任期时的政府科技支出反应系数明显高于官员第二任期时的科技支出反应系数,即在官员晋升激励更强的时期,地方政府科技支出竞争更激烈,说明在相对绩效考核方式下,地方官员会围绕科技创新展开标尺竞争,提高政府对科技创新的投入,改善政府支出结构。 |
关键词: 晋升激励 标尺竞争 官员任期 地方政府科技支出 两区制空间杜宾模型 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20190511 |
分类号:F812.7 |
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目“经济发展方式转变成效评价研究及其实证分析”(11BTJ015);中国社会科学院“哲学社会科学创新工程基础学者”资助计划。 |
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Official Tenure, Yardstick Competition and Local Government S&T ExpenditureNew Evidence Based on Chinese Municipalities Data and Two-Regime Spatial Durbin Model |
LI En-ji1, LI Qun2
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1.Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China;2.Institute of Quantitative & Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
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Abstract: |
Based on the data of prefecture level cities in China from 2003 to 2016, it used the tenure of officials to analyze the impact of promotion incentives on local government S&T expenditure. The results show that: under the multi-dimensional performance appraisal, local officials strategically arrange government S&T expenditure during their term of office, and the relationship between their tenure and local government S&T expenditure is U-shaped, and the turning point occurs in the fifth to sixth year of their tenure. In addition, under the promotion incentive, the local government has significant complementary strategic interaction in S&T expenditure, and the response coefficient of government S&T expenditure in the first term of office is significantly higher than that in the second term of office, that is, when the promotion incentive is stronger, the competition of local government S&T expenditure is more intense, which shows that under the relative performance appraisal mode, the local government S&T expenditure response coefficient is significantly higher than that of the official second term, Local officials carry out yardstick competition around S&T innovation, increase government investment in S&T innovation, and improve the structure of government expenditure. |
Key words: promotion incentive yardstick competition official tenure local government S&T expenditure two-regime spatial Durbin model |