摘要: |
结合混合所有制改革背景,本文选取2007—2018年沪深A股上市公司的24 394个样本,探讨了异质性大股东对于企业创新的影响。主要研究发现如下。第一,在国有企业和融资约束型非国有企业中,引入异质性大股东可以显著增加企业创新投入,且当异质性大股东持股比例越高时,这一效应会越为显著。第二,机制上,国有企业引入的非国有大股东通过发挥监督治理作用、降低控股股东占款的路径,提高了企业创新水平。而融资约束型非国有企业引入的国有大股东则通过为企业建立有效政治联系、发挥资源支持效应的路径,提高了企业创新水平。第三,进一步分析表明,当异质性大股东派驻代表参与董事治理时,其提升企业创新水平的效果会越为显著。本文有助于深入理解国有控股下的非国有大股东以及非国有控股下的国有大股东差异化的治理作用,丰富并拓展了混合所有制改革的研究框架。 |
关键词: 异质性大股东 创新投入 监督 融资约束 政治关系 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20201256 |
分类号:F275 |
基金项目:国家社会科学基金后期资助项目一般项目“政府治理与国企改革经验——基于中国政治经济理论的智慧”(19FGLB045);浙江理工大学科研启动项目“混合所有制改革与企业创新行为”(21092120-Y)。 |
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Impact of Heterogeneous Large Shareholders on Enterprise Innovation Investment in the Mixed Ownership ReformA Comparative Analysis Based on State-Owned Enterprises and Non-State-Owned Enterprises |
DI Ling-yu1, BU Dan-lu2
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1.School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, Hangzhou 310018, China;2.School of Accounting, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China
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Abstract: |
Combined with the mixed ownership reform, it selected 24 394 samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 to explore the impact of heterogeneous large shareholders on enterprise innovation. The results are as following. Firstly, in state-owned enterprises and financing constrained non-state-owned enterprises, the introduction of heterogeneous large shareholders significantly increase enterprise innovation investment, and the higher the proportion of heterogeneous large shareholders, the more significant this effect is. Secondly, in mechanism, the non-state-owned large shareholders introduced by state-owned enterprises improve the level of enterprise innovation by playing the role of supervision and governance and reducing the amount of money held by controlling shareholders. However, the state-owned large shareholders introduced by financing constrained non-state-owned enterprises improve the level of enterprise innovation by establishing effective political connections and giving full play to the effect of resource support. Thirdly, further analysis shows that when the heterogeneous large shareholders send representatives to participate in the governance of directors, the effect of improving the level of enterprise innovation is more significant. It helps to understand the governance role of non-state-owned large shareholders under state-owned holding and the differentiation of state-owned large shareholders under non-state-owned holding, enriches and expands the research framework of mixed ownership reform. |
Key words: heterogeneous large shareholder innovation investment supervision financing constraint political relationship |