摘要: |
创新是公司维持竞争优势的重要手段,但绩效良好的公司为何创新投入下降?本文以2012—2019年附属企业集团的上市子公司为样本,基于代理理论视角,探索阻碍绩优子公司技术创新的影响因素,研究发现:子公司绩效良好时,其创新投入下降;母公司的掏空行为、公司间的关联交易、高管的代理行为阻碍了绩优子公司的创新投入。进一步探索如何降低绩优子公司代理行为,研究发现:独立董事对子公司两类代理行为的监督约束作用不明显;机构投资者能够抵制母公司对绩优子公司的利益侵占行为;外部制度环境削弱了高管的代理行为。本文从代理理论角度揭示了绩优子公司创新投入低的内在影响机制,并从管理层、公司层、环境层3个层次为如何降低子公司代理行为、释放创新潜力提供了借鉴。 |
关键词: 绩效反馈 母子公司 代理行为 技术创新 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20201873 |
分类号:F270 |
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重大项目“新时代加强中国中小微企业国际竞争力的模式与路径研究”(18ZDA057);中国博士后科学基金资助项目“母子公司双向治理对企业集团技术创新的影响研究:微观机理与实证检验”(2020M672011);山东省自然科学基金项目“集团视角下子公司绩效反馈对扩张变革的影响研究”(ZR2020QG012)。 |
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Internal Mechanism of Innovation Resistance of Good-Performance Subsidiaries |
ZHENG Li1, CHEN Zhi-jun2
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1.School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China;2.School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
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Abstract: |
Innovation is an important factor for a company to maintain its competitive advantage, but why the company with good performance invests less in innovation. Based on the data of the listed subsidiaries from 2012 to 2019, exploring the factors that hinder technological innovation of the subsidiary from the perspective of agency theory, it finds that innovation input decreases when the performance of the subsidiary is good; and the tunneling behavior of the headquarters, related party transactions between companies within business groups and the agency behavior of senior executives are the influencing factors that hinder technological innovation of the good-performance subsidiaries. Further study explored how to restrain the agency behavior. The results show that the supervision impact of independent directors on the two kinds of agency behaviors of subsidiaries is not significant; institutional investors restrain the tunneling behavior of headquarters to the subsidiary with good performance; the external institutional environment weakens the agency behavior of senior executives in the good-performance subsidiaries. It reveals the internal influencing mechanism of low innovation investment in the good-performance subsidiaries from the perspective of agency behavior, and provides suggestions on how to restrain the agency problems of subsidiaries and reduce innovation resistance from the management level, company level and environment level. |
Key words: performance feedback headquarters-subsidiary agent behavior technology innovation |