摘要: |
近期,双边平台“二选一”独家交易行为受到广泛关注。通过构建双寡头动态博弈模型,并考虑竞争对手面对平台排他行为的策略反应,研究发现,当平台间横向差异较大且服务成本较低时,一家平台实施排他性协议,竞争对手平台选择积极应对是均衡结果。进一步,地福利分析发现独家交易策略会损害消费者剩余,造成社会福利损失,有很强的反竞争效应。研究结论不仅丰富了经济学对于双边平台滥用市场势力的理论研究,也为今后平台经济领域的反垄断执法提供理论借鉴。 |
关键词: 双边市场 竞争瓶颈 非对称收费模式 独家交易 平台反垄断 |
DOI:10.13581/j.cnki.rdm.20211906 |
分类号:F062.9 |
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“家用主机游戏市场中的网络外部性与平台企业竞争问题研究”(CXJJ-2020-395)。 |
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Strategic Options and Anti-Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing by Platforms |
CHEN Qian
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College of Business, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
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Abstract: |
The exclusive dealing behavior of “pick one of two” on two-sided platforms has received widespread attention. It constructed a duopoly dynamic game model and considered the strategic response of competitors to the platform’s exclusive behavior. The result shows that when there is a significant horizontal differentiation between platforms and the service cost is low, there is an equilibrium that one platform implements exclusive dealing and the competitor platform chooses to actively respond. Furthermore, welfare analysis reveals that exclusive dealing leads to loss of consumer surplus and social efficiency, which implies that exclusive dealing strategy has the strong anti-competitive effect. The conclusions not only enrich the economic research about platforms’ abuse of market power, but also provide references to antitrust authorities in the future. |
Key words: two-sided market competitive bottleneck asymmetric fee charging exclusive dealing platform antitrust |