Based on the flexible incentive characteristic of employee compensation stickiness, which tolerates failure and promotes fairness, it theoretically analyzed the influence of employee compensation stickiness on corporate innovation efficiency and the moderating effect of executive-employee compensation stickiness gap between them. Moreover, it took A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as samples and conductd empirical test with stochastic frontier analysis model. It finds out that employee compensation stickiness exerts fault tolerance incentive effect, and significantly improves corporate innovation efficiency; meanwhile, as a reflection of the unfairness of the distribution rules, the stickiness gap between executives and employees significantly inhibits the improvement of employees' stickiness on corporate innovation efficiency. After a series of robustness tests, the above conclusions are still valid. Further analysis shows that low disposable income level of employees, high and new technology industry background and high level of market competition help employees' compensation stickiness play a role in improving corporate innovation efficiency, and the gap of executive-employee salary stickiness has a negative moderating effect on the above effects. The conclusions expand the research perspective of corporate innovation efficiency and economic consequences of compensation stickiness, and enrich the study of situational factors of compensation stickiness and innovation efficiency. It also provides empirical support for the design and arrangement of corporate compensation system.