Higher returns are gained by the innovation projects with higher originality and complexity. However， the longer time-consuming it takes making the innovation easier to be destroyed by the competitors， which leads to the uncertain changes in their expected returns. Based on the above trade-offs， it examined the influence of the complementarity of the two types of capital （human capital and material capital） and Schumpeterian competition on innovation originality， innovation complexity， and the distribution of the residual claim rights of the innovation team. The results show that Schumpeter’s competition is negatively correlated with innovation complexity and the distribution of residual claim rights； the impact of Schumpeter’s competition on innovation originality and innovation team effort depends on the complementarity of the two types of capital， and the unique ability of the innovation team plays a moderating role； whether the principal-agent relationship exists or not， the relative level of innovation originality and team effort depends on the complementarity of the two types of capital， while the relative level of innovation complexity depends on Schumpeter’s competition. The results highlight the impacts of Schumpeterian competition intensity and the complementarity between material capital and human capital on innovation project selection and innovation incentives， which also improve the operability of enterprise’s respondence to the external changes and the management on innovation team.