摘要: |
本文通过构建平台和借贷双边用户的演化博弈基准模型,引入平台竞争和监管机构,研究P2P网贷平台信用风险的控制策略.研究结果表明:完善的征信体系有助于提高借款人违约成本;平台是否合规经营的决策受平台声誉、合规经营收益和违约经营收益等多方面因素的影响,违约借款人的比例越低,则平台合规经营的可能性越高,信用风险越低;平台的自我约束和自我激励均有限,平台竞争不利于平台控制信用风险,政府监管对控制平台信用风险、推动行业可持续发展具有重要作用.基于此,本文提出构建政府—平台—用户的双层信用风险控制体系,并提出具体信用风险控制策略建议. |
关键词: P2P网贷 平台信用风险 监管 演化博弈 |
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Evolutionary Game Analysis on Credit Risk Control in P2P Online Lending Platforms |
丁岚
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Abstract: |
It established game models among regulators, P2P platforms, borrowers and investors based on the evolutionary game theory to discuss how to reduce P2P platforms'credit risk. It shows that well-established social credit system is helpful to decrease borrowers'default risk. Whether platforms operate properly depends on several factors including platform reputation, profits under proper and improper operation. What's more, the higher percentage of high-quality borrowers, the more likely platform will behave properly, and the lower of platform's credit risk. As P2P platforms' self-restraint and self motivation are insufficient, and competition may even deteriorate credit risk, regulatory agencies play an important role in controlling platforms'credit risk and promoting sustainable development of P2P lending industry. Based on above conclusions, it proposes to construct a two-layer credit risk control system for government platform-user, and then gives the specific strategies on constructing this credit risk control system. |
Key words: P2P lending platforms'credit risk regulation evolutionary game theory |